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HOW BLOCKED GAS DETECTORS CHANGE 
THE APPARENT CONCENTRATION OF GAS 
Ian Webster1 
ABSTRACT: The operation of a diffusion type gas detectors used in fixed, machine mounted 
and handheld applications is reliant on the natural equalisation of dissimilar gas concentrations 
driven by partial pressures inside and outside the detector. 
Typically, this equalisation is inhibited (to a greater or lesser degree) by protective filters and 
barriers surrounding the fragile sensing elements from the typically harsh ambient 
environments. The accumulation of dust and other foreign matter on the protective filters can 
further inhibit the diffusion of gas into a detector. 
The usual calibration process for a gas detector – typically by a ‘bump’ or ‘challenge’ test – will 
often fail to detect when a detector is blocked, or partially blocked. This can lead to the 
‘calibrated’ detector reading high or low, but with no way to determine if that is the case. 
Retrospective examination of records and equipment from Pike River Mine lead to the 
conclusion that critical detectors were affected by filter blockages, resulting in methane 
detectors reading approximately one-half of the true concentration. 
This presentation explores how a blocked detector can give an erroneous reading, and what 
steps can be taken to avoid replicating previous mistakes. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Pike River Mine disaster in 2008 was investigated by multiple parties: the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012) was 
notably transparent in its deliberations and public in publishing its findings. A number of matters 
relevant to gas detection safety systems were raised. 
GAS DETECTORS AT THE PIKE RIVER MINE 
The underground workings at Pike River were separated into ‘Restricted’ and ‘Non-Restricted’ 
zones, generally based on the likelihood of explosive gases (methane at 0.25% vol/vol) (New 
Zealand Department of Labour, 2011). Equipment in the Restricted zone was required to be 
explosion protected, while equipment in the Non-Restricted zone was generally not explosion 
protected. 
The perimeter of the Non-Restricted zone was monitored by a series of catalytic methane 
sensors. See Figure 1. These detectors were configured to trip electrical power when the 
ambient atmosphere reached 0.25% vol/vol methane. The efficacy of this means of protection 
was arguably compromised by the close proximity of the detectors to the Restricted zone – in 
some cases a distance of only several metres (New Zealand Department of Labour, 2011). 
Such proximity made no allowance for the response time of the detector, nor for the inevitable 
telemetry or tripping delays, given the flow of general body air forced by the mine ventilation. 
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Figure 1: Designated Restricted and Non-Restricted zones at Pike River Mine 
Inside the Restricted zone, personnel and explosion protected equipment were guarded by 
three (identical) catalytic detectors configured to trip electricity supply at 1.25% methane. 
Of particular interest were the two methane detectors, located respectively at the bottom and 
top of the main ventilation shaft. These two detectors monitored the same general body of air, 
albeit with a delay (associated with the transport lag of air moving up the ventilation shaft). 
The detector at the bottom of the shaft was believed to have been mounted in a conventional 
manner, and readily accessible to maintenance workers. The detector at the top of the shaft 
was reportedly suspended down the shaft a distance of several metres, in an unidentified 
orientation. The top of the ventilation shaft was located in a generally inaccessible area, making 
checking and maintenance of the detector problematic. When last calibrated (prior to the first 
explosion), the sensor at that location was reported as ‘wet and muddy’. 
Approximately eleven weeks prior to the first explosion, the detector at the base of the 
ventilation shaft was withdrawn from service. The control room console marked the detector as 
‘Faulty – waiting for spare’. See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Control room console showing detector out of service 
(Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012) 
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When compared to the last recorded data from the methane detector at the base of the shaft, 
the surface fan detector appears to be reading at half the value of the detector at the base, 
even though no dilution of the methane concentration was possible in the ventilation shaft. See 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Comparative methane detector readings at bottom (in blue) and top (in red) 
of main ventilation shaft at Pike River Mine 
(Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012) 
In the absence of the identical detector previously located at the bottom of the shaft, this 
detector was the principal sensor measuring the concentration of methane in the general body 
of air. 
THE RECOVERED DETECTOR 
After the series of four explosion at the Pike River Mine, investigators somewhat fortuitously 
recovered the methane detector previously located at the top of the ventilation shaft. It had 
been ejected from the mine at some point, and was discovered in adjacent bushland. 
The recovered detector had sustained superficial damage, but was otherwise intact. See Figure 
4. 
 
Figure 4: Recovered methane detector from top of main ventilation shaft 
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The display was found to be non-functioning. Connections terminals inside the enclosure were 
present, but damaged. See Figure 5. The sensing element of the methane detector was 
occluded by significant debris. See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 5: Recovered methane detector from top of main ventilation shaft 
 
Figure 6a: Sensing element occlusion on recovered methane detector 
 
Figure 6b: Sensing element occlusion on recovered methane detector 
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The detector was subjected to a forensic performance examination. The detector was found to 
be operational, albeit reporting gas concentrations of approximately 50% of the applied 
concentration. This reading anomaly is consistent with the data from the mine site during 
operation. Significantly, the response increased after the debris was removed from the sensor 
housing. 
The Gasguard Sensor (Serial No. 24063004) was inspected. Access to the 
enclosure was precluded by mechanical damage to one corner of the lid obscuring 
fixing screw. DII staff ground the lid to enable access to internal electronics. 
Blast damage had ripped external wiring through cable gland. DIN rail fittings were 
burned and fractured. Coal dust and charred remains were located inside 
enclosure.  Some insulation in internal wiring was damaged and missing. Printed 
circuit boards appeared to be in relatively good condition. Identification labels were 
partially obscured. Wiring harness to catalytic bead was unplugged. 
The sensor was powered from the controller, drawing ~25 mA load current with 
catalytic bead disconnected. This was considered normal. The liquid crystal display 
on the enclosure lid did not operate. 
The catalytic bead harness plug was re-inserted. Load current increased to ~72 
mA – again normal. The sensor output was measured at 5.4 mA (expected to be 4 
mA will zero methane). 
The sensor output was connected to the controller input. With zero methane 
controller read 0.3%. 
Methane gas at 1% concentration was applied. The sensor responded relatively 
slowly, rising to an indicated 0.43% (not steady state). 
Methane gas at 3% concentration was applied. The sensor again responded 
relatively slowly, rising to an indicated 1.47% (not steady state). 
The stone guard, hydrophobic barrier were removed, together with an 
accumulation of coal dust and debris. 
Methane gas at 3% concentration was re-applied. The sensor again responded 
more quickly, rising to an indicated 2.06% (not steady state). 
(Webster, 2014) 
At the time of the examination, no further consideration was given to the anomalous readings, 
other than to note that the response time of the detector was inordinately slow. 
RESPONSE TIME TESTING 
The examination of the recovered detector prompted a hypothesis that occluded detectors 
would have slower response (t90)1 times than a ‘clean’ detector. The hypothesis was tested 
using an artificially occluded detector in a laboratory environment. 
Figure 7 shows the measured response times. The conjecture that more severely occluded 
detectors have slower response times was confirmed. 
Moreover, it was also observed that more severely occluded detectors also converged to lower 
indicated concentrations, even though the same concentration of test gas was applied in each 
instance. 
This observation is consistent with the reported differences in detector readings from the bottom 
and top of the ventilation shaft at Pike River. The sensor at the top of the shaft was observed 
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to be compromised by debris, and the difficult access to that location could have limited frequent 
inspections and maintenance. 
 
Figure 7: Detector response times with varying degrees of debris occlusion. 
Vertical axis is gas concentration (CH4% vol/vol); horizontal axis time time (secs) 
WHY BLOCKED DETECTORS READ INCORRECTLY 
Subsequent work has further examined the relationship between occlusion and measured 
accuracy. 
Firstly, comparisons were made between catalytic type and Infrared (IR) types of sensing 
elements. It was observed that occluded IR detectors exhibit the same (slower) response times 
as do catalytic detectors, but do not deviate in (final) measured accuracy in the same way as 
do catalytic detectors. 
Catalytic detectors, unlike IR technologies, consume methane during the sensing process. 
Such detectors require a constant flow of methane, and oxygen, to sustain the catalytic process. 
Furthermore, the by-products of the catalytic process need to be exhausted from the bead 
surroundings. 
It follows, then, that there is a constant flow of gas into, and out of, a catalytic detector, unlike 
an IR where a static gas sample remain essentially unaffected by the measurement process. 
This gas flow in the catalytic detector is clearly vulnerable to impediment by accumulated debris 
on the protective housing and filtering system. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MINIMISE THE EFFECT OF OCCLUSION 
The most obvious mitigation strategy to avoid compromise of detectors by occlusion is to keep 
the sensing elements (and associated filters) clean. This is of course problematic in 
underground coal mines where coal dust and stone dust are frequently encountered in general 
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Direct measurement of the effect of occlusion caused by accumulated debris is difficult in 
practice. A technique that measures differential pressure across filters and membranes caused 
by a known, constant flow rate of test gas has been demonstrated to quantify occlusion. See 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Measurement of occlusion by pressure differential 
The applicability of that test, however, is predicated on being able to access both sides (‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’) of the filter structure – a requirement that is generally not feasible in commercial 
detectors. 
The demonstrated relationship between response time and reduced sensitivity of catalytic 
sensing devices also offers some insights. 
Routine gas detector maintenance practices typically include a bump test whereby a test gas 
of known concentration is presented to the detector, and the detector adjusted to read that test 
concentration. Assuming that the calibration process itself does not impinge on the detector 
reading (say, by presenting gas at an increased pressure above ambient), this approach can 
arguably be used to compensate for the decreased sensitivity caused by occlusion. However, 
increasing the (amplitude) sensitivity of the detector does not address the compromise in 
detector response time. That is, an occluded detector may be adjusted to show correct 
concentration, but in the absence of direct measurement the response time can be 
compromised. 
To this end, AS/NZS 2290.3 (2018) Maintenance of gas detectors in underground coal mines 
(Standards Australia, 2018) was recently revised to make response time testing a periodic 
requirement of the maintenance regime. The justification was two-fold: 
• A compromised response time is itself a compromise of the fundamental safety 
function realised by the gas detector. 
• A compromised response time in a catalytic detector is an indication of occlusion by 
debris. 
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Further work in the area is continuing through an ACARP1 project in association with Simtars 
and CMTS2. 
OTHER ISSUES WITH GAS MEASUREMENT AT PIKE RIVER 
The various aspects of safety and operations at the Pike River Mine have been documented in 
the media and in the Royal Commission Final Report (Royal Commission on the Pike River 
Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012). Amongst these, one other aspect of the gas detection installation 
significantly compromised is reporting of true gas concentrations. 
Figure 9 shows a portion of the methane concentration log from the surface detector. An 
extended duration of ‘flat-lining’ at a concentration of 2.96% CH4 is readily apparent. This 
behaviour was considered sufficiently anomalous to warrant further investigation. 
 
Figure 9 Portion of the methane concentration log from the surface detector 
The general configuration of the detector, controller, telemetry links and programmable logic 
controller (PLC) are shown in Figure 10. The detector and controller were both located in the 
Restricted Zone, and hence were explosion protected (intrinsically safe). The PLC was located 
outside of the Restricted Zone and, to maintain explosion protection, an intrinsically safe barrier 
was inserted between the controller and the PLC. The total resistance of the PLC and zener 
barrier was calculated and measured to approximately 550 Ohms. 
Figure 11 shows the loop resistance versus loop current for controller. It is seen that the 
maximum loop resistance to enable full excursion of the loop current (to 20 mA) was 
approximately 330 Ohms. At the actual loop resistance of 550 Ohms, the maximum loop current 
was approximately 13.6 mA, which corresponded to a methane concentration of 2.96%. 
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Figure 10 General configuration of the detector, controller, telemetry links and PLC 
for surface methane detector 
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Figure 11 Loop resistance versus loop current for controller 
It follows, then, that the gas controller could never indicate a concentration of greater than 
2.96%, notwithstanding any actual measured concentrations at the detector. Significantly, 
bump testing (calibration) of the detector was typically conducted at 2.0% – 2.5% methane, 
meaning that the telemetry deficiency was never revealed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The series of explosions at the Pike River Coal Mine were the culmination of a large number of 
factors that impacted the operation and safety of the underground mine. Significantly amongst 
these, the accurate and timely measurement of instantaneous concentrations of explosion 
methane gas were found to be problematic. 
One of the contributing factors was the accumulation of foreign debris into the environmental 
filters protecting the catalytic sensing element. The significance of this accumulated debris, and 
the effect on gas detection responsiveness and accuracy, were either not know, or not 
acknowledged. 
A program of research has been initiated to quantify the effect this occlusion on gas detectors 
in coal mines, so as to inform the coal mining industry of the potential hazards and risks. 
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